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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELL PITCHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Civil No. 10563 
C. W. LAURITZEN, 
Def-endant and Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought action against Defendant to recover 
the reasonable value of hay and straw taken from his 
farm in the Summer and Fall of 1962, and for conversion 
of the hay. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging a valid 
earnest money receipt for the sale of the farm, claiming 
the hay and straw taken, and requested specific perform-
ance of the contract, and or damages for breach of the 
contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court submitted the question of reasonable 
value of the hay and straw to the jury and adopted the 
jury's findings as to value. The additional question of 
repudiation was submitted to the jury, and remaining is-
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sues tried to the the Court. The Court found in favor of 
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and awarded judg-
ment for reasonable value of the hay and denied specific 
performance of the earnest money receipt as requested in 
Defendant's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts 
as outlined by Appellant, and restates the facts to give 
a more complete picture of the case now before the Court. 
On October '14, 1961 Ravsten Healty obtained a 6 
months farm listing from Plaintiff (Def. Exh. 7). The 
h~ting called for a cash sale of his farm at the price of 
$126,000.00. Towards Spring of 1962, Ben Ravsten, real 
estate man, contacted Plaintiff and stated Defendant was 
interested in the farm and had reduced the price of 30 
acres of land in North Logan and that he, the real estate 
agent, had a prospective purchaser for the property, and 
that if Plaintiff would sign the Earnest Money receipt he 
could move the property by May 1, 1962 (See Dep. 27 
and Tr. 140-141). 
Plaintiff signed and delivered the Earnest Money 
receipt on the express condition that he was not interested 
~n the North Logan property, which he had never seen, 
and that the final contract would not be agreed upon, pre-
pared or closed until the sale of the North Logan property, 
at which time this sale could go through. (Tr. 140-141, 
151 and Dep. 27). 
The Plaintiff and Defendant had never met together 
prior to or at the time of signing the Earnest Money 
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Receipt. Signatures of each of the parties was obtained 
separately by the real estate agent Ravsten. (Tr. 49-50, 
122). The contract expressly provided: 
"The total purchase price of $100,000.00 shall be 
payable as follows: $100.00 which represents the 
aforesaid deposit, receipt of which is hereby ac-
knowledged by you. $ ________________ on delivery of deed 
OR FINAL CONTRACT OF SALE WHICH SHALL 
BE ON OR BEFORE MAY 1, 1962. Balance of the 
purchase price to be paid as follows: 30 acres in 
North Logan as indicated by map, valued at $50,-
000.00 $25,000.00 cash from loan on SELLERS 
FARM; Seller to carry the balance on contract or 
second mortgage at 5% interest." (Def. Exh. 1). 
The real estate man did not make a sale of the North 
Logan property by May 'l, 1962, or at any other time. No 
final contracts were ever discussed, drafted, presented or 
signed. (Tr. 87). Loan application was made by the 
real estate agent but no loan for more than $12,600.00 
could be obtained on Seller's farm (Tr. 124, 126). 
The real estate agent called on the parties at different 
limes and got them together about twice at his office in 
an attempt to reach a meeting of the minds on a possible 
deal for the above and other and different property 
(Tr. 28). 
Sometime in the Summer of 1962, the real estate 
agent called Mrs. Pitcher and stated the Defendant was 
in need of hay and would it be agreeable for him to get 
Plaintiff's hay. Mrs. Pitcher told him that they (the Plain-
tiffs) had no animals to feed and that she would 
consult her husband about Defendant's request. Later 
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she told the real estate agent the hay was for sale and 
that the Defendant could remove it from the Plaintiff's 
farm (Tr. 149). The real estate agent relayed this infor-
mation to the Defendant but the said real estate agent 
could not remember any details about the hay (Tr. 178-
179). This matter was never discussed between the 
parties themselves (Tr. 29). There is no issue raised on 
this appeal as to the Defendant taking the hay and straw 
or its value of $3,487.00, the amount fixed by the jury and 
in the judgment ( R. 2). 
Each of the parties remained in possession of their 
respective lands and subsequent negotiations between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant were directed towards an en· 
larged deal (Tr. 89, 133, 191). 
On June 16, 1963, the Defendant and his son came 
to the home of the Plaintiff to go over the farm. The 
Plaintiff had gone to church and the Defendant and his 
son looked over some property not mentioned in the 
Earnest Money Receipt. They then came back to the 
house and Mrs. Pitcher testified as follows: 
"A. I was going to get Marcell (Plaintiff) for 
them and they said 'No, they would go to the farm 
and look it over and they would be back.' I told 
them when they came back, I would go get him. Mr. 
Lauritzen came back. It was a quarter to twelve 
when he came. I told him I'd get Marcell and he 
said, 'no, just tell him the deal is off.' He left." (Tr. 
63-64). 
Thereafter, the parties met only a couple of times 
(Tr. 28). During these meetings the Plaintiff a ttemped 
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to collect his money for the hay and straw. (Tr. 32). It 
wasn't until Plaintiff brought this action in an attempt to 
collect the bill for the hay and straw, that he learned of 
the claim of the Defendant, that the Earnest Money 
receipt was still valid. It wasn't until the trial that 
the Defendant tendered a deed and offered to pay $25,-
000.00, the amount of the loan (Tr. 159-160). During this 
lime (approximately 2 years) the Plaintiff had made val-
uable improvements on his farm in excess of $20,000.00 
(Tr. 189). 
\Vhile the evidence is somewhat conflicting in many 
respects the Court made the following Findings: ( R. 37). 
3. That neither the Plaintiff or Defendant had 
met the other at the time the Earnest Money Con-
tract was signed, but signatures were obtained by 
one B. J. Ravsten, real estate broker, who represented 
to the Plaintiff that the price of the North Logan pro-
perty had been reduced and that had a prospective 
purchaser for the same. The said B. J. Ravsten stated 
that he expected to close the sale of the North Logan 
property within ten days. The Plaintiff relied upon 
these statements and signed the Earnest Money Con-
tract, believing no final contract would be entered 
into to close the transaction until the North Logan 
property had been sold. 
4. That at the time Plaintiff signed the Earnest 
Money Agreement no map was exhibited to him and 
he had never seen the premises. The Plaintiff stated 
to the real estate man that he was not interested in 
the North Logan property unless the same could be 
sold for cash, which he needed to get into the sprink-
ler pipe business. That the 30 acres mentioned in 
the Earnest Money Agreement to be traded by De-
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fondant to Plaintiff for $50,000.00 was a part of the 
189 acre tract owned by Defendant and a description 
of this 30 acres was not obtained until a survey was 
made in October, 1962 and the same was never ac-
cepted by the Plaintiff. 
5. That no final cantract was ever prepared, 
made or presented to the Plaintiff within the time spe-
cified therein or within a reasonable time thereafter, 
by the real estate agent or either of the parties. That 
no conveyance of any property was ever prepared 
or ever presented to either party for signalure until 
at the trial in 1965, when the Defendant prepared 
and tendered a deed to the North Logan property 
( 30 acres). That an attempt was made to obtain a 
loan of $25,000.00 but no loan for such sum could br 
obtained or any sum in excess of $12,600.00. That 
by reason thereof it was impossible to perform this 
condition of said contract and Plaintiff is excused of 
any performance under the terms of the Earnest 
Money agreement. 
6. That the said Earnest Money contract made 
no mention as to the time for possession for the Pit-
cher form or the North Logan property. That each 
of the respective parties remained in possession of 
their respective properties. That at no time prior to 
the removal of the hay and straw by Defendant did 
either party request of the other the right to posses· 
sion of the property agreed to be sold or exchanged. 
That both prior to and after the removal of the hay 
and straw, there were some negotiations in the office 
of the real estate broker to assemble a contract agree-
able to the parties, but at no time were the terms of 
such contract agreed upon. That the taking of the 
hay was not taking possession of the property under 
the Earnest Monev contract and Defendant was not 
entitled to ownership of the hay or other crops before 
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obtaining possession of the real property or until the 
purchase price therefor was paid. 
7. That during the latter part of July or the 
first part of August, 1962, the real estate agent called 
Plaintiff's wife on the phone and stated that the 
Defendant was in need of hay and asked if Plain-
tiff had hay to sell. Thereafter, the real estate agent 
reported to the Defendant that Plaintiff had hay 
available and he could get the same. That between 
August 15, 1962 and November 15, 1962, the De-
fendant or his agents removed at least 165 ton of 
hay and 44 ton of straw from Plaintiff's farm. That 
no conversation was had between the parties con-
cerning the removal of hay until August, 1963, when 
Plaintiff attempted to collect the amount due from 
the Defendant from the hay and straw, at which time 
the Defendant conditionally offered to pay $2,000.00 
for the same. That at the time the hay and straw 
were removed by the Defendant from Plaintiff's farm, 
it was baled and stacked, except the Third Crop hay 
and straw, which were baled but still in the field. 
That Plaintiff believed he was selling the hay to 
Defendant and Defendant believed he was entitled 
to the hay under the Earnest Money Contract. 
8. That there was no meeting of the minds of 
the parties with regard to the sale of the hay, and 
the Court further finds that at that time the Earnest 
Money Contract had not been performed according 
to his terms. The Defendant used the straw and fed 
the hay to his cattle. That Defendant has not paid 
any sum to the Plaintiff for the hay or straw and the 
Court accepts the jury findings on special verdict of 
the hay as being in the sum of $3135.00 and the value 
of the straw being in the sum of $352.00, making a 
total of $3487.00 for both. The Court finds said 
amounts are a fair and reasonable value for the hay 
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and straw removed by the Defendant from Plaintiff's 
farm. That by reason thereof, the Defendant is in-
debted to the Plaintiff for the sum of $3487.00, plus 
interest thereon at 6% per annum from November 1.5, 
1962 to date hereof in the sum of ~656.25. 
9. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff 
retained possession of his farm property for the years 
1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965. That he paid for and 
harvested all crops thereon during these years, and 
made valuable improvements on the said farm dur-
ing this time in the sum of $20,000.00. That it would 
be inequitable and unjust to attempt to grant specific 
performance of the original Earnest Money Agree-
ment, which would unjustly enrich the Defendant 
after this long and unreasonable length of time, even 
though the Court finds such agreement was a valid 
contract in its inception, but further finds that the 
said agreement was subsequently abandoned by the 
parties, and that negotiation thereafter were directed 
to an effort of making a new contract, which was 
never agreed upon. 
POINTS OF APPEAL 
1. Where the Defendant obtained hay from Plain-
tiff without any meeting of the minds as to the terms of 
the purchase of the hay and without consideration, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the fair market value 
of the hay. 
2. The Earnest Money receipt in this case is not 
specifically enforceable because it is indefinite and mt-
certain as to many necessary details essential to the con-
tract. 
3. That the conduct of each of the parties and fail-
me to finalize a contract within the time specified in the 
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Earnest Money Receipt or a reasonable time thereafter, 
was sufficient evidence of abandonment of the Earnest 
Money Contract, if the same was a valid contract. 
4. It was impossible to finalize the Earnest Money 
receipt according to its terms. 
5. That because of changed conditions within more 
than three years between the signing of the Earnest 
Money receipt and the trial of the case, it would be grossly 
unjust to grant specific performance of the contract at 
this time. 
ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE REASON-
ABLE VALUE OF THE HAY AND STRAW TAKEN BY 
DEFENDANT FROM HIS FARM IN THE SUMMER 
AND FALL OF 1962 WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 
The Defendant apparently does not contend that 
the value of the hay and straw is unreasonable. The law 
seems well settled in this point that plaintiff is entitled 
to reasonable value of the hay or quantum Meruit. 
To begin with, it should be stated that the rule in law 
cases in this State has been well established over a long 
period of time as follows: 
"The Trial Court's finding in a law action must be 
sustained on appeal if supported by any substantial 
competent evidence." Vadner v. Rozzelle 88 Utah 
162, 45 P. 2nd, 561. 
"In law cases, the Supreme Court is bound by 
Findings of Fact of the Trial Court if supported by 
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any competent evidence." Harper v. Tri-State Mo-
tors, Ins. 90 Utah 212, 58 P. 2nd 18. 
"In law cases, trial court's findings are not dis-
turbed unless so clearly against weight of evidence 
as to indicate misconception or lack of due consider-
ation thereof. Greco v. Gentile 88 Utah 255, 53 
P. 2nd 1155. 
"In law cases, the findings of the trial court are 
approved, if there is sufficient competent evidence to 
support them, and are disturbed, unless it is mani-
fest that they are so clearly against the weight of 
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a due 
consideration of it." Jensen v Howell 75 Utah 64 
282 Pac. 1034. 
While no Utah case on the question of growing crops 
has been mound, a recent well considered Idaho case, 
Nuquist v. Bauscher 227 P. 2nd 83, 85, does seem to be 
in point: The Idaho Court says: 
"The general rule is, subject to exceptions not 
herein necessary to discuss, that if there is no agree-
ment, expressed or implied, in a contract for the sale 
of real estate, the purchaser is not entitled to posses-
sion until the full payment of the purchase price has 
been made, and if the purchaser complies and re-
ceives the deed to the premises, he is then, and not 
until then, entitled to possession of the property sold." 
"The rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. 808, Par. 385, 
2s follows:"H 0 that if there is no agreement, express 
or implied, in a contract for the sale of real estate, 
that the vendor shall deliver possession of the prem-
ises before the foll payment of the purchase price, 
the purchaser is not entitled to the possession: and 
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that a mere contract for the sale of real estate which 
provides that if the purchaser complies with his part 
of the contract and pays the purchase price as agreed, 
the vendor will then deed the property, raises no 
legal inference that possession of the property is to 
be given before the deed is to be executed." 
"The rule covering growing crops on premises 
is stated in 15 Am. Jr. 202, Par. 11 as follows: "If, 0000 
the purchaser is given no right to the possession until 
until the time for conveyance arrives, he acquires no 
interest in the growing crops which mature and are 
harvested before the time for the conveyance and his 
right to possession arrives." 
"A discussion of cases on the subject would serve 
no useful purpose and would unnecessarily extend this 
opinion to an unreasonable length. For a review of 
the subject matter and cases thereon, see: Barrell v. 
Britton, 244 Mass. 273, 138 N.E. 579, 28 A.L.R. 1069." 
Wilson v. Sanchez 254 P. 2nd 594 in a California case 
supporting the same rule of right to possession. 
In the interest of brevity we refer to the Note in 28 
A.L.R. 1069, where many cases are listed, for the rule in 
the Idaho case. 
Rules on Appeal in equity cases are as follows: 
"Supreme Court has full power to review all questions 
of law and fact in equity case and to set aside trial 
Court's judgment if, in opinion of Supreme Court, 
such judgment is not supported by evidence, but, 
where case was regularly tried and trial court found 
on all material issues, its findings will not be dis-
turbed by Supreme Court unless they are so mani-
festly erroneous as to demonstrate oversight or mis-
take which materially affect substantial rights of 
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appellant." McKay vs. Farr, 15 U. 261 49 P. 649; 
Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 U. 45 57 P. 712; Elliot v. 
Whitmore, 23 U. 342, 65 P. 70. 
See also: 
Omega Inv. Co. v. Woolley, 72, U. 474, 271 P. 797 
Escamilla v. Pingree, 44 U. 421, 141 P. 103. Sidney 
Stevens Implement Co. vs. South Ogden Land, 
Building & Improvement Co. 20 U. 267, 58 P. 843. 
Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton 85 U. 294, 
39 P. 2d 682. 
39 P. 2d 682. Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2nd 251; 
265 Pac. 2nd 420. 
There are no special circumstances in the case at bar 
that would indicate the Defendant was to take possession 
of the property before the final contract was agreed upon 
and executed. All the evidence in this case why the 
Plaintiff should not be entitled to a judgment for the 
value of the hay and straw as entered by the Court. 
2. THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IN THIS 
CASE IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCEABLE BE· 
CAUSE IT IS INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO 
MANY NECESSARY DETAILS ESSENTIAL TO A 
CONTRACT. 
Counsel for appellant cites authorities holding that 
an Earnest Money contract can be specifically enforce-
n ble. These authorities have no fact situations similiar to 
this case. There is no evidence that plaintiff changed his 
mind as contended by defendant. Plaintiff has always 
maintained that the contract was signed on the condition 
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of the sale of the North Logan property, and the conduct 
of the parties and the real estate agent indicates that the 
parties understood this. 
In the case of Bowman et al vs. Reyburn et al, Colo-
rado 170 P2d, 271 at page 275 the Court says: 
"The contract must be enforced according to its 
terms or not at all. A COURT IS WITHOUT AU-
THORITY TO COMPEL A PARTY TO DO SOME-
THING HE DID NOT CONTRACT TO DO. In 
the case of Schmidt v. Barr, 165 NE 131, 135, 65 ALR 
1. This Court said in Hunt vs. Rousmaniere's Adm'rs 
1 Pet 1, 14, 7 L. Ed. 27 Equity may compel parties 
to perform their agreements, when fairly entered into, 
according to their terms; but it has no power to make 
agreements for parties, and then compel them to 
execute the same. The former is a legitimate branch 
of its jurisdiction, and in its exercise, is highly bene-
ficial to society. The latter is without its authority, 
and the exercise of it would be not only a usurpation 
of power, but would be highly mischievous in its 
consequences." 
In the case of Adams v. Renders 168 US 573, 18 S. 
Ct. 179, 182, 42 L. Ed 584, the Court states: 
"In an action for specific performance, the Con-
tract must be free from ambiguity and it must be 
clearly established that the demanded performance 
is in accordance with the actual agreement of the 
parties. Offutt v. Offutt, Md, 67 A. 138. "A greater 
amount or degree of certainty is required in the 
terms of an agreement, which is to be specifically 
executed in equity, than is necessary in a contract 
which is to be the basis of an action at law for 
d " amages. 
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Before a contract can be specifically enforced the 
contract must be complete, definite and certain. 
In 65 ALR 102 it states: 
" .... On the other hand, a suit in equity is wholly 
an affirmative proceeding, its objective being to pro-
cure a performance by the Defendant specifically, 
and this requires a clear and precise understanding 
of the terms of the contract, for they must be CLEAR 
AND DEFINITE before the performance thereof can 
be decreed." 
In the Oregon case of Smith vs. Vehrs 242 P2d 586, 
page 589, it states as follows: 
"In Berry v. Wortham supra, 96 Va. at page 89, 
30 S.E. at page 444, the Court said: "It is an elemen-
tary doctrine of Courts of equity that they will not 
specifically enforce any contract unless it be com-
plete and certain ... .It must be complete in all its pmts; 
that is, all the terms which the parties have adopted 
as portions of their contract, must be finally and 
definitely settled, and none must be le~ to be de-
termined by future negotiations; and this is true with-
out any regard to the comparative importance or un-
importance of these several terms." 
The above case also holds that the Court cannot make 
clear that which is left in doubt and uncertain. For this 
reason it would have been error for the Trial Court, in 
our opinion, to attempt to make a contract for these parties 
with regard to the Earnest Money Receipt now before the 
Court. The Defendant failed to prove what property was 
intended to be conveyed by the parties as listed upon the 
said Earnest Money Receipt. The attention of the 
of the Court is called to the testimony of Marcell Pitcher 
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THEREAFTER, WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
ABANDONMENT OF THE EARNEST MONEY CON-
TRACT EVEN IF THE SAME WAS A VALID CON-
TRACT IN ITS INCEPTION. 
The facts show that following the execution of the 
contract on or between April 16 and 20, '1962, that no 
final contract was ever prepared or offered to Plaintiff 
for signature. 
The record indicates that various attempts were made 
over a period of many months to put a deal together, but 
the terms were never agreed upon or completed. 
The conduct of the parties clearly indicates that they 
never considered the Earnest Money Receipt a binding 
contract or anything other than a preliminary attempt to 
see if a deal could be put together. 
Defendant never called upon Plaintiff to request 
possession of the farm. He retained possession and con-
trol of his North Logan property and Plaintiff kept pos-
session of his farm in Cornish and Weston. 
After the Earnest Money Receipt was signed Defen-
dant did not undertake to farm the property of the Plain-
tiff, or show any interest in crops such as grain, beets 
and hay which were planted and harvested. The De-
fendant did not attend to the plowing, planting of 
crops, protecting the property, or do anything of any 
kind to produce or harvest any crops. He did not irrigate 
the hay, cut, rake, bale or stack the hay. Certainly this 
conduct is inconsistent to that of a person who claims 
to have purchased property or was bound by a contract 
to purchase it. 
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The foregoing is ample to negotiate the argument of 
counsel that Lauritzen did everything he could to get the 
contract completed. The fact is he did absolutely nothing 
at all until after the hay was stacked or the third crop 
baled in the field. Plaintiff had the hay for sale. Ravsten, 
the real estate agent, arranged for Lauritzen to go get it. 
(Tr. 149). The parties were still negotiating and Ravsten 
was still trying to find a buyer for the North Logan pro-
perty. Pitcher made no objection to Lauritzen taking the 
hay, assuming he would pay for it. 
The admitted actions or conduct of the Defendant all 
indicate an abandonment. On June 16, 1963, the De-
fendant expressly manifested this intent when he told Mrs. 
Pitcher the following: 
"Just tell him the deal is off." (Tr. 64). 
This manifestation of his intent, together with his 
prior conduct supports a finding of abandonment by the 
Court. The Plaintiff's conduct in keeping possession of 
the property, farming it and cropping it as he did for the 
years 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 clearly establishes his 
intention that he never considered the contract as valid 
or binding. The fact that he made improvements upon 
the farm during this time, in excess of $20,000.00 is entirely 
inconsistent with Defendant's argument that he did not 
have the necessary intent to abandon. 
Since the Court found the contract was valid in its 
inception, the only reasonable conclusion the Court could 
reach from the conduct of the parties was the time for 
performance fixed in the agreement had long passed, that 
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they subsequently abandoned the deal. This finding 
would not have been necessary if the Court had correctly 
found this ECl.rnest Money contract was not valid and 
binding as contended by the Plaintiff in his Cross Appeal. 
4. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE LOAN 
AND FINALIZE THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT 
ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS: 
In this case, the efforts to obtain a loan were made 
by the Plaintiff through Mr. Ravsten, the real estate agent. 
Mr. Ravsten, however, was not able to get a loan for 
more than $12,600.00 on Sellers (Plaintiffs) property. 
(Tr. 124, 126). 
The record shows there was some mention of a 
$25,000 loan committment being made by Cy Clark upon 
the North Logan property (Tr. 124-125). When Mr. 
Ravsten attempted to get this loan the money was no 
longer available (Tr. 128, 129). Remember that North 
Logan property was not Sellers property as specified in 
the Earnest Money receipt; upon which a loan was to be 
obtained. 
As to the impossibility argument, Counsel for ap-
pellant, seems to indicate that it was plaintiff's respon-
sibility to obtain the loan. The fact that there were pre 
existing mortgages on his farm is immaterial. There ic; 
no evidence in the record indicating that these mortgages 
were the reason that the loans could not be obtained. 
Counsel is merely speculating and attempting to blame 
plaintiff (because a loan could not be obtained). One 
might ask what did defendant do towards obtaining the 
loan. All the efforts of Mr. Ravsten were directed to-
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wards getting the parties together and finalizing some of 
the points which were left open at the time of the original 
negotiations of the contract. ( Dep. 7 and 8). 
"Impossibility of performance of contract is de-
fense to action for specific performance thereof, 
though impossibility is Defendant's fault, as equity 
will not order defendant to do something beyond his 
power." Rachou v. McQuitty et al, Mont. 1951, 
229 P2d 965, 968, citing Rest: of law of contracts Sec. 
368, p. 669. Also 5 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed. 
Sec. 1422. p. 3973. 
In the case of Crittenden v. Hansen et al, Cal. 1943, 
138 P2d 37 pages 38 and 39 the Court stated as follows: 
"But since the contract has become unenforce-
able, appellant is confronted with the settled rule that 
specific performance will not be required when its 
enforcement would be impossible or inequitable." 
The facts of this case clearly fall within this an-
nounced rule of law. 
5. IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST 
FOR THE COURT TO GRANT SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE OF THIS CONTRACT THREE YEARS OR 
MORE AFTER IT WAS EXECUTED. 
In this case, the Trial Court, sitting as a Court of 
equity, had the duty to look carefully at all the evidence 
and determine whether equity and justice could be ob-
tained by granting specific performance. 
More than three years and five months elapsed be-
t ween the time of the execution of the Earnest Money 
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receipt and the trial where the Defendant requested the 
Court to grant specific performance. This was only after 
the Plaintiff brought a lawsuit for the purpose of recover-
ing money for the value of hay and straw removed by the 
Defendant from his farm in the Summer and Fall of 1962. 
During the intervening time, Plaintiff made considerable 
improvements in the farm. (Tr. 140, 89). To force the 
Plaintiff to now sell under the original terms would cause 
irrepairable damage to the Plaintiff. 
As to Counsel for Appellant's third point, that the 
plaintiff could not recover the improvments made on the 
[arm in 3}~ years, he cites the case of Erisman v. Overman 
11 Utah 2d 268, 358 P. 2d 85. This case is not similar to 
our case in any facts whatsoever. In that case the de-
fendant had entered into possession, failed to make 
monthly payments as required in the escrow contract for 
a period of 10 month, apparently claiming the right to 
offset the payments for a sewer hookup. During the time 
they made improvements on the home, and then after 
::i.ction was brought against them for delinquencies under 
the contract they tried to recind the contract and collect 
for improvements. In our case, possession was never sur-
rendered. Each party farmed their own lands. Plaintiff 
never considered his farm as sold, and defendant never 
made claim to it until after action was brought by plaintiff 
for the price of the hay in the summer of 1963. 
In 61 ALR page 58 it states: 
"In the exercise of its discretionary powers to 
determine when the equitable relief of specific per-
formance may be invoked, on the general rules form-
ulated and followed is that this equitable relief will 
not be granted if, under the circumstances, either 
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because of the inequitable enforcement of the con-
tract would be harsh, inequitable, oppressive or 
unconscionable. . " 
The Defendant, after this long delay should be 
estopped from asking for specific performance, after know-
ing that the deal never did go through and the final con-
tract was never made by May 1, 1962 as contemplated 
by the parties, and from asking this Court for Specific 
Performance, when this action was brought for the pur-
pose of recovering money for the purchase price of hay 
and straw, which the Defendant admits he received and 
never paid for. 
Near the end of the trial the Court was exploring 
the question of whether the offer was fair and just and 
might result in an agreeable compromise settlement of 
the case. The following record is recited. 
"The Court: I have got to ask you again, Mr. 
Pitcher. Now here is a deed to the North Logan 
property. Mr. Lauritzen is ready to give you $25,-
000.00 in cash and then sign a note and a mortgage 
on your property up there for $25,000.00. Now 
what's wrong with that?" 
A. "This here price of this property in North 
Logan for $50,000 is so unrealistic, your honor, that 
it isn't worth a tenth of that." 
A. "The reason we signed this thing was, Mr. 
Ravsten made the statement that he could sell the 
property, and it was on that premise that we signed 
it. (Tr. 162). 
Finally, the Court of equity here considering all the 
facts and circumstances of the case can only do justice 
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between these parites by leaving them as the owners of 
their respective properties. The Defendant is out nothing 
whatever. He got the Plaintiff's hay and fed it to his 
cattle and should pay for it. 
If specific performance were granted here on the 
vague and insufficient terms of the Earnest Money re-
ceipt or the offer above referred to, thus forcing the 
Plaintiff to take the two tracts, 20 acres of which is still 
s:1ge brush land comprising approximately 30 acres with 
no rental value shown and for which no sale can be found, 
it would result in the Plaintiff suffering a loss of approx-
imately one half of the list price of his property, when the 
loss of the improvements placed on the property by Plain-
tiff is considered. 
There was no meeting of the minds of the parties on 
any such a deal and the Court should not make it for 
them. 
CROSS APPEAL 
RESPONDENT CROSS APPEALS FROM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE EARNEST 
.MONEY RECEIPT WAS A VALID CONTRACT IN ITS 
INCEPTION. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
Respondent cross appeals from the Trial Court's rul-
ing that the Earnest Money Receipt was a valid contract 
and relies on the following points: 
1. That the Earnest Money receipt (Def. Ex. 1) did 
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not contain a sufficient description of the land to be sold 
or received to contribute an enforceable contract." 
2. That there was no map prepared of the North 
Logan property until the late Fall of 1962. The map 
finally offered in evidence as a survey was prepared by 
Defendant without consulting the Plaintiff or giving him 
an opportunity to accept or agree to it. It was totally 
unacceptable to the Plaintiff. 
3. That the contract is indefinite and slient as to 
who was to make the $25,000 loan or its terms and condi· 
tions or who was to pay the same or necessary terms to 
constitute a contract for sale or exchange of real eseate. 
4. Contract fails to set forth whose obligation it was 
to pay the existing FHA mortgage on Plaintiff's property 
in the sum of $23,000.00. 
5. The said Earnest Money Agreement was ex-
pressly signed upon the representation and belief that 
the real estate agent had or would have a sale for the 30 
acres before the terms of a final contract would be agreed 
upon before May 1, 1962. That this was a mere prelim-
inary step towards a later final agreement. 
6. That there was never a meeting of the minds of 
the parties as to any of items 1 to 6, but they did, by 
words and conduct, establish that the said Earnest Money 
contract was merely a temporary receipt to be finally 
determined if the transaction could be finalized by agree-
ment. 
-26-
ARGUMENT 
In the interest of brevity the previous arguments in 
support of the above points are not repeated here but 
should apply also on the Cross Appeal. 
The description of the property to be conveyed by 
Plaintiff is as follows: 
220 acre Pitcher farm, 60 acres Bambrough farm 
and 160 acre Weston Farm. 
Together with all water rights and owners in-
terest in well, pump and sprinkler pipe at Cornish, 
Cache County, Utah. 
To be received by Plaintiff, "30 acres in North 
Logan as indicated by map." 
These descriptions come squarely within the rule 
in the case of Adams vs. Manning 46 Utah 82 148 Pac. 
46,) where this Court, in a well considered opinion, said 
rnch a description could not be construed to meet the 
statute of frauds. In that case, as here, there were 
other lands owned by the vendor and it was not pos-
~ible to identify from the document which land was 
intended to be transferred. The Court says if that is 
sufficient, what becomes of the statute of frauds. There 
was claimed possession in that case and yet the Court 
reversed the Trial Court, saying that the possession shown 
was not sufficient part performance. There is nothing 
that even squints of part performance here. 
No surveyor or anyone else could take these descrip-
tions and locate any land. The Court found there was no 
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map shown to the Plaintiff and the record amply estab-
lishes this finding (Tr. 131, 146). Defendant Exhibit 3 
from which it appears the description in the deed tendered 
at the trial was prepared in the Fall of 1962 and platted in 
December 1962. It was prepared by the Defendant with-
out consulting Plaintiff or giving him an opportunity to 
accept it. The record is not clear when, if at all, this was 
shown to Plaintiff but it is clear that the Plaiintiff never 
accepted it or agreed to it. 
The Survey allots Parcel "A" 21.6 acres in the South-
east corner of the 189 acre tract and Parcel "B" near the 
Northwest corner of the larger tract. The two tracts, ac-
cording to the scale of the map are about 3600 feet (almost 
.7 mile) apart. The survey did not purport to survey the 
fence lines that could mark the boundaries or property in 
mind. If the Defendant could pick out two tracts of sage 
or uncultivated land for the 30 acres, what is to prevent 
him from picking out a dozen other pieces. Certainly, 
there was no evidence that the Plaintiff knew there were 
to be two pieces (he had not seen the land when he signed 
the agreement (Tr. 131) and he was never willing to 
agree to these descriptions. 
In the depositions of Mr. Ravsten, the real estate 
.igent, he stated that at the time of the execution of the 
contract by the parties, he did not have any maps which 
which he referred to that would have described the pro-
71erty used in the Earnest Money receipt. (See Dep. 
page 21 lines 21 to 28). 
We believe Counsel for Defendant must admit that 
part of the Plaintiff's home farm was not intended to be 
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included in the sale as evidenced by Mr. Ravsten's testi-
mony, (Dep. page 3, line 27), wherein he states that the 
home place was not to be included in the deal. It should 
be noted further that the Plaintiff has additional land in 
~md around the said area, and no indication is given where 
the dividing lines would be between the lands purportedly 
intended to be .sold herein and the lands that he intended 
to keep. 
This leaves the record devoid of any evidence of the 
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the descriptions 
of the property. 
In the case of Durham vs. Dodd, 79 Ariz. 168, 285 
P 2nd 747, 749, the Court, construing the interpretation 
of contract therein, cites the Re-statment of Law on Con-
tract, Section 207, which prescribes a test to determine 
the adequacy of a memorandum to make enforcible con-
tract under this statute of frauds. This section provides: 
"A memorandum, in order to make enforcible 
a contract within the Statute, may be any document 
in writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to 
be charged or by his agent actually or apparently 
authorized thereunto which states with reasonable 
certainty, ... (b) the land, goods, or other subject mat-
ter to which the contract relates, and ( c) the terms 
and conditions of all the promises constituting the 
contract and by whom and to whom the promises are 
made." 
This case further states that the boundaries must 
be ascertainable from the memorandum and that this 
cannot be supplied by parole. It cites 139 ALR, 965 an 
annotation. 
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A Washington case of 1960, Bigalow vs. Mood, 353 
P. 2d 429, 430 states: 
"We have held consistently that in order to 
comply with the statute of frauds, a contract for 
deed for the conveyance of land must contain a de-
scription of land sufficiently definite to locate it 
without recourse to oral testimony, or else it must 
contain a reference to another instrument, which does 
contain a sufficient description (citing numerous 
) " cases . 
The rule established by the above authorities clearly 
establish that there must be a meeting of the minds as to 
the identity of the property being sold or traded. The 
description could not be selected and prepared by the 
Seller without some agreement by the Buyer. If the Trial 
Courts ruling in this case is affirmed, let us have a ruling 
that the Adams v. Manning case, Supra, is overruled and 
that real estate agents are encouraged in their preparation 
of these form Earnest Money receipts to just insert a 
number of acres and then select any piece of property out 
of a larger piece that suits their convenience to hold the 
purchaser, so that they can collect their commission. 
Surely this Court is not going to go that far. 
The real estate agent, Ravsten, testified in his deposi-
tion, which was published (Tr. 173), that there was no 
meeting of the minds as to many of the terms of the con-
tract as indicated by the following testimony: 
Q: "And did you discuss with Mr. and Mrs. Pitcher 
or either of them the matter of the balance of 
the $25,000 on the transaction, whether it would 
be by contract or second mortgage?" 
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A: "That it would be contract, and as I recall, al-
though the details had not been worked out, 
I'm not certain whether it was a ten or a fi~een 
year period." 
Q: "It was one or the other, but you've forgotten." 
A: "That's correct." 
Q: "And were those details worked out at or about 
the time this draft of April 16, 1962, was made?" 
A: "They were discussed but were left open. When 
this was prepared pending some decisions on the 
part of Mr. Pitcher, as I recall the details." (Dep. 
7 & 8). 
In addition to the failure to have a proper description 
that would satisfy the Statute of Frauds the Earnest Money 
receipt and offer to purchase is defective in that it pro-
vides that part of the purchase price was to be a $25,000 
cash loan on Seller's farm and that there is no statement 
in the contract indicating what type of loan this was, what 
interest rate would be paid, when it would be payable, 
what annual payments were to be made and who was to 
make the payments, what land was to be mortgaged, who 
would obtain the Loan and who would pay it. 
It is obvious from the long effort and negotiations 
that took place over the Spring, Summer and Fall of 1962, 
::rnd Spring and Summer of 1963, that no loan was ever 
obtained on the said property, thus complying with this 
provision of the Earnest Money contract. It would ap-
pear, that this fact alone, would be sufficient grounds to 
hold that the Earnest Money contract was fatally de-
fective. 
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A further reason why the contract is defective is that 
it provides that the balance of the purchase price would 
be carried on a contract or second mortgage at 5% interest. 
Here again, there are no terms spelled out concerning the 
method of payment, who was to make the payment, 
whether or not it was to be made on an annual, monthly 
or other basis or whether it was to be on a contract or a 
second mortgage. Thus, we have in this particular Earnest 
Money receipt, areas which make the contract fatally de-
fective as a sufficient memorandum to comply with the , 
Statute of Frauds as required by statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff is entitled to an affirmance of the fudg-
ment for the reasonable value of the hay. Even if the 
Earnest Money receipt was a valid contract in its incep-
tion, it was an executory contract only, and never was 
executed to the point that would pass any title to the 
crops. 
The Court erred in holding the Earnest Money re· 
ceipt was a valid contract in its inception. If this point 
is now sustained, as we contend it should be, the other 
discussions about specific performance will need no fur-
ther consideration. 
The Earnest Money receipt was so indefinite, un· 
certain, and left so many items "Open" that it cannot be 
found to be so definite, clear and complete as to justify 
a judgment of specific performance. 
The Court should not undertake to make some con· 
tract for these parties that they were not willing to make 
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for themselves. This is not a case where the Plaintiff 
changed his mind. His conduct and actions were all con-
~istent with his testimony as to the conditions upon which 
he signed the paper. 
To grant specific performance here would do uncons-
ionable injustice to the Plaintiff. To deny specific per-
lormance injures no one unless consideration is given to 
the right of the real estate agent to collect his commission. 
Any one of the four matters mentioned in in the last 
four paragraphs is sufficient to sustain the trial judgment 
nf the Trial Court. 
If there are technical errors in some of the rulings of 
~he Court, growing out of some confusion in the record, 
all such errors were harmless and should be passed by in 
the interest of ending these three years of litigation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRIS & HARRIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 
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